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ARTICLE
Before the dust settled: is Nepal’s 2015 settlement a seismic
constitution?
Michael Hutt
SOAS University of London, London, UK
ABSTRACT
Two significant institutional developments occurred in the aftermath
of the major earthquakes that struck Nepal in 2015: a new national
constitution was drafted and promulgated and a National
Reconstruction Authority was established. The constitution had
been promised for over seven years, and was now completed within
just over threemonths, while it took sevenmonths for a Bill establish-
ing the NRA to be passed in parliament. Many commentators have
posited a direct causal relationship between the earthquake and the
‘fast-tracking’ of what was in certain respects a contentious constitu-
tion. Drawing upon conversations and interviews conducted in Nepal
over the winter of 2017–18 and a close reading of media discourse
and political analysis from 2015, this article will examine and assess
the extent of this supposed causality. Given that the most radical and
contentious change ushered in by the new constitution was the
introduction of a federal structure for the state, particular attention
will be paid to the evolution of the debate on this issue.
KEYWORDS
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‘Life rolls on, reducing whatever small shifts and diversionary rubble a calamity stirs up into
immemorable dust.’ (Hoffman 1999: 304)
Introduction1
What effect does a major disaster have on the politics of the society that suffers its
impacts? More particularly, if a state is undergoing a process of political change or
transition when a disaster strikes, will that disaster necessarily affect the direction,
speed or general inflection of that process? If we think for a moment of a political
transition, or indeed of history more generally, as a text that is in the course of being
written, we might ask whether and in what circumstances a disaster will serve as a full
stop, bringing a grammatical end to a particular line of political discourse or institutional
development. Alternatively, and especially with the benefit of hindsight, we might also
wonder whether a disaster that appeared at first sight to be bringing an end to something
might actually turn out to represent something more akin to a comma or a semi-colon:
a mere pause, a temporary distraction, after which the process of change and the
discourse that accompanies it carry on much as before.
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Some years ago, Disaster Studies specialists began to express concern that insuffi-
cient attention was being paid to such questions. Albala-Bertrand, for example,
wrote that the ‘endogenous response’ to disasters was being disregarded, feeding
a ‘technologically biased approach to disaster response, at the expense of political
and socio-economic structure and dynamics’.2 In their widely-cited article on dis-
asters, critical junctures and ‘tipping points’, Mark Pelling and Kathleen Dill com-
plain of the ‘exceptionalism and apolitical construction of disasters’, about which
most knowledge is generated by ‘practitioners, humanitarian agencies and donors’
and ‘coloured by agency viewpoints’.3 They identify three ‘discursive moments’ in
a typical aftermath. The first moment, they say, focuses attention on the unequal
distribution of losses and can lead to a questioning of development failures and
asymmetry in the social contract; the second draws attention to the mobilisation of
state and non-state actors to champion, direct, counter or capture evolving critical
discourses; the third sees the discourse being institutionalised into policy. They
discuss the potential for a disaster to provide either a ‘critical juncture’ (a contesta-
tion of established political, economic and cultural power) or an ‘accelerated status
quo’ (a successful concentration of that power – ‘a concentration or speeding up of
pre-disaster trajectories which remain under the control of powerful elites . . . ’)4
Capoccia and Kelemen have described how the concept of critical junctures has been
used to construct causal arguments in historical institutionalist literature, defining
critical junctures as ‘brief phases of institutional flux’ which punctuate ‘relatively long
periods of path-dependent institutional stability and reproduction’. Critical junctures are
characterized by a situation in which the structural (that is, economic, cultural, ideological,
organizational) influences on political action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short
period, with two main consequences: the range of plausible choices open to powerful political
actors expands substantially and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest
are potentially much more momentous.’5
Pelling and Dill believe that change initiated at the moment of a critical juncture is
‘made concrete in a revision of the social contract, or at least in the balance of underlying
institutions.’6
Olson and Gawronski (2003) discussed the application of the term ‘critical juncture’ to
the aftermaths of the 1972 Nicaragua and 1985 Mexico City earthquakes:
Simply put, both Nicaragua and Mexico were “different countries” ten years after their
disasters, and the underlying question kept coming up: What was the role of each country’s
disaster in the national transformation? Applying the critical juncture framework compara-
tively to the two events, their aftermaths, and regime change then brought up a second
question: Is there a broader utility for critical juncture analysis in disaster research? That is,
can and should the framework be further adapted and applied to other major disasters? Would
such an effort be fruitful beyond merely better description?7
While long term political effects may well be argued for in these and other cases, it is
surely generally true that if a disaster possesses any causal force in the political sphere it is
during its immediate aftermath that this will be most clearly apparent. As time passes and
an aftermath lengthens, a ‘time decay effect’8 inevitably sets in: attempts to trace causal
links between disasters and subsequent developments become increasingly speculative,
and the risk of teleological historicism grows.
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This article will explore these questions with reference to the first six months of the
aftermath of the earthquakes that struck central Nepal in April and May 2015, killing
nearly 9000 people and damaging or destroying homes, schools, infrastructure and
religious and cultural heritage sites across 31 of the country’s 75 districts. To what
extent does the ‘critical juncture’ framework help us to understand what happened in
the immediate aftermath of this catastrophe? Do the empirical specificities, the ‘better
description’ of this particular aftermath, accord with or challenge this model?
The 2015 Nepal earthquake aftermath
It is not difficult to identify two key political moments in the immediate aftermath of the
major earthquakes that struck Nepal in 2015:
(1) The leaders of Nepal’s four largest political parties signed an agreement on
the basic principles of a new constitution for the country 45 days after the
April earthquake, and the constitution that emerged from the drafting process
that ensued was promulgated just over three months later, on 20 September.
Thus, a constitution that had been promised but not delivered for seven years
(despite agreement between the parties on many of its key features and
principles) was eventually completed and promulgated within a timeframe
of just over 100 days.
(2) In contrast, the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) came into being much
more slowly. The President of Nepal approved an ordinance to establish this body
three months before the constitution was promulgated, but the Bill to establish the
NRA was not passed in parliament until nearly three months after the promulga-
tion, and no staff (other than its CEO) were appointed to it until January 2016,
seven months after the first earthquake. The slow progress of the reconstruction
effort that year was parodied in many cartoons in the Nepali news media, includ-
ing that shown in Figure 1.
The drafting of the new constitution took place in a context of resurgent post-earthquake
patriotism and calls for national unity, particularly among Nepal’s hill populations, most of
whom celebrated its eventual promulgation. Other groups, notably most of the political
leadership of the Madhesi population of the southern Tarai lowlands, considered the new
constitution to be a regressive document. They therefore rebelled against it, with conse-
quences that included over fifty deaths in clashes between security forces and protestors,
and a grievous deterioration in Nepal’s relationship with India, which was accused of
mounting a six-month economic blockade in support of the Madhesi agitation.
On 10 November 2017 a Nepali parody of the popular song ‘Despacito’ was posted on
YouTube with the title ‘Desh Sakkiyo’ [The Country is Finished] and quickly went viral.
This song conflates the three major events of 2015 (the earthquake, the new constitution,
and the blockade) as follows:
ho bhuinchaloko pida ajhaisamma ni yo manma thiyo
sarkarle naya samvidhan po diyo
bharatle nakabandi garidiyo
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Yes, the pain of the earthquake was still there in this mind,
[When] the government gave a new constitution
[And] India blockaded us.9
When these developments are viewed in outline – from a distance, as it were – there
would indeed seem to be a direct causal relationship between the 2015 earthquakes, the
prioritisation and ‘fast-tracking’ of the constitution, the Madhesi uprising against it, and
the ‘blockade’ (nakabandi), which lasted from shortly after promulgation until early
February 2016. The relationship between the earthquake and the constitution, at least,
has been presented in precisely these terms in many narrative accounts.10
The following discussion draws primarily upon the Nepali media discourse of the
period in question,11 supplemented by close readings of published political analyses and
conversations and interviews conducted in Nepal over the winter of 2017–18 and during
subsequent visits in 2018 and 2019, to examine and assess the extent of the 2015 earth-
quakes’ supposed political causality. Given that the most radical change ushered in by the
new constitution was the introduction of a new federal structure for the Nepali state,
particular attention will be paid to the evolution of the debate on this key issue.
The political context
The Interim Constitution and the first Constituent Assembly (2007–12)
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), concluded in November 2006 at the end of
the ten-year war between the then Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Nepali
Figure 1. The slowness of the National Reconstruction Authority: cartoon by Basu Kshitej, from the
Annapurna Post, 16 April 2016. Reproduced with the permission of the publisher.
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state, included commitments to draft and promulgate an interim constitution and then to
elect a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution that would permanently replace it.
The CPA also committed its signatories to engage in a ‘forward-looking restructuring of
the state by resolving the prevailing problems related to class, ethnicity, regional and
gender differences’.
The Preamble and Articles 33(d) and 138 of the Interim Constitution (2007) main-
tained this commitment to a ‘progressive restructuring of the state’. However, the
publication of a draft of this document provoked political protests in Nepal’s southern
Tarai districts in December 2006, and its promulgation in January 2007 was followed by
mass civil unrest across the region, in what is now commonly referred to as the first
madhes andolan [Madhes Movement]. This continued until the government conceded
the movement’s principal demands. Before proceeding any further, a brief excursion is
necessary here to explain the historical bases of Madhesi discontent.
Madhesi is the term used for a heterogenous 33% of Nepal’s population who are defined
variously in terms of region (they reside in or hail from the Tarai lowlands, the Madhes);
language (their mother tongues are cross-border languages such as Maithili, Bhojpuri or
Awadhi, and Hindi serves as a lingua franca for many of them); and ethnicity (mostly in
a negative sense: Madhesis are explicitly not Pahadis, hill people.)12 Thus,Madhesi is not an
ethnic or caste label: it might be most accurately described as a political or even an
experiental term: ‘the people living in a particular region (the Tarai or Madhes) who feel
discriminated against by the Pahadi-dominated state’13 – though even this definition
excludes others from the same region such as the Tharus or the Tarai Muslims, who may
feel the same way but hold themselves to be ethnically distinct.
The Anglo-Nepal war of 1814–16 was the starting point of the discrimination against
the Madhesis by Nepal’s Gorkhali rulers, and a prohibition on Madhesis entering the
state’s security forces was its legacy. Under the Rana family autocracy (1846–1951), the
people of the Tarai had to obtain written permission to enter the Kathmandu Valley, and
during the Panchayat regime (1962–90) the Madhesis fell outside the frame of national
identity encapsulated by the palace-sponsored nationalist slogan ek desh, ek bhesh, ek
bhasa (‘one country, one dress, one language’). Until 2006, the widespread absence of
birth certificates and other documents to prove their Nepali origin made it almost
impossible for many Madhesis to acquire citizenship, without which they could not
own land, apply for government jobs, register births or marriages, obtain a passport,
stand for elections, register a business, get bank loans, or access government benefits. For
about thirty years from the 1950s onward the government encouraged hill people to
migrate to the plains, partly in order to keep Madhesis, perceived by many in Kathmandu
as sympathetic to India, in check.14 Despite all of the above, academia and the media paid
scant attention to Madhesi concerns until the 2006–7 andolan.
Madhesi political leaders argued that they had long been systematically under-
represented in Nepal’s electoral system, and protested that the commitment to ‘restruc-
turing’ made in the Interim Constitution was too vague. The amendment that was made
to the constitution in April 2007 therefore made an explicit commitment to a federal
structure, promised under-represented groups access to state bodies on a proportional
basis, and re-delineated a number of Tarai constituencies to take account of population
growth. The number of federal units, the basis on which they would be created, and the
delineation of their boundaries would subsequently become highly contested matters.15
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Nepal conducted elections to a 601-seat Constituent Assembly (hereafter ‘CA’) in
April 2008. The Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) emerged as the
largest single party, with 238 seats (39.6% of the total). The Nepali Congress (NC) and the
Communist Party of Nepal (UnifiedMarxist-Leninist – referred to as ‘the UML’ hereafter),
gained only 114 and 109 seats respectively, while three Madhes-based parties shared a total
of 83 seats. Compared with the three parliaments of the 1990s, the representation of
indigenous [Adibasi] Janajati groups rose from 25 to 36 per cent, of Madhesis from 12 to
24 per cent, of Dalits from practically nil to 8 per cent, and ofwomen from5 to 33 per cent.16
The Khas-Arya who have historically constituted the dominant group achieved
a representation of 33%, roughly in line with their share of the total population. All of
this represented a dramatic and largely unexpected shift in the balance of power, and was
reflected in the agenda of the first CA, which was dominated by debates on ‘secularism,
multilingualism, identity-based federalism, self-determination, collective rights for ethnic
groups, preferential rights for marginalised groups, inclusive electoral design and propor-
tional representation’.17
According to Article 70 of the 2007 Interim Constitution, the primary means by which
the Preamble and each article of the new constitution was to be approved was through
a unanimous vote at a meeting of the CA attended by at least two-thirds of its member-
ship. Without a numerical majority, the political forces that favoured radical structural
change18 – the Maoists and the Madhes-based parties – were not able to prevail over the
more conservative parties. There were also disagreements on the form of government
(presidential vs parliamentary; bicameral vs unicameral); the judiciary (constitutional
court vs Supreme Court); electoral systems, and so on.19 Thus, despite four extensions to
its term of office and the installation and dismissal of five different coalition governments,
the first CA failed to produce a constitution and was dissolved in May 2012.
Its legacy was a 22-point agreement between the three main parties (UCPN-M, NC,
UML) dated 15 May 2012 which sought compromises on key disputed issues. However,
Madhesi organisations began agitating against this agreement even before it was finally
ratified, and the UCPN-M backtracked from it quickly thereafter. This eventually led to
the demise of the first CA, creating a state of constitutional and political stalemate.
The second Constituent Assembly (2014–15)
The second Constituent Assembly was elected in November 2013. The NC and the UML
emerged from these elections as the two largest parties, the UCPN-M came a poor third,
losing 154 of its seats to finish with only 84, and the Madhes-based parties won only 50
seats. The Maoists and Madhes-based parties boycotted the newly-elected CA at first,
claiming that the elections had been rigged against them, but their complaints were given
little credence.
The caste and ethnic composition of the second CA was also somewhat different from
that of the first: for example, the historically dominant Khas-Arya increased their share of
seats to 41 per cent. Perhaps more importantly, the three largest parties disallowed the
formation of cross-party caucuses, such as the Janajati Caucus that had been so influen-
tial in the first CA. The NC and the UML maintained similar positions on most of the
more contentious constitutional issues, and although their combined majority fell just
short of the two-thirds needed to pass a constitution through a vote, they were confident
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of gaining enough support from smaller parties to obviate the need for any negotiations
with the Maoists or the Madhes-based parties.
Sushil Koirala came to power on 22 January 2014 as the head of a new NC-UML
coalition government, and promised that his government would complete the drafting of
the constitution within one year. The coalition parties’ leaders decided not to bother to
seek a broad consensus, which would inevitably lead to some measure of compromise on
issues of federal structure and inclusivity, but to proceed on the basis of majority
voting.20 Meanwhile, a Maoist-led alliance of thirty smaller parties (of which only nine-
teen were represented in the CA) advanced a common position on key constitutional
issues, including an insistence on identity-based federal provinces, and urged that the
constitution should be approved through consensus.
The NC and UML were hostile to the idea of identity-based federalism, which
they saw as ‘an external agenda, as weakening Nepali sovereignty, and as nationally
divisive’.21 They sought to minimise the number of provinces, and insisted that
these would have to be based on ‘geography, historical continuity and economic
viability’ and preferably carved out along north-south lines so that they included
both hill and Tarai districts, which was precisely the opposite of what the Madhes-
based parties were demanding. Although their predominance in the second CA
meant that they did not need to take the Maoists’ views into account, the NC and
UML believed that the Maoists still had enough support to disrupt the process
through street protests and agitations. They therefore decided to offer them a share
in power after the constitution had been promulgated, but they also sought an
arrangement that ‘would not disturb the prevailing dominance of the upper-caste
hill groups . . . in the political order’;22 this dominance was caricatured in a famous
cartoon by Rabin Sayami, reproduced here as Figure 2. The Madhes-based parties
were not especially concerned about the total number of provinces, but they insisted
that the new structure must include provinces that consisted solely of Tarai districts,
entirely segregated from the hills.
As the deadline of 22 January 2015 loomed, tension between the two power blocs
within the CA grew, with the Maoist-Madhesi coalition enforcing strikes in various
locations. When the CA failed to deliver the constitution as promised, there was pressure
on Sushil Koirala to resign. As the co-leader of the coalition government, the UML leader
Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli wanted a turn as Prime Minister, but Sushil Koirala’s publicly
stated position was that he would not step aside for anyone until after the constitution
had been promulgated. The main parties had settled many contentious issues, but the
question of the federal structure remained unresolved.
Meanwhile, the Maoist-led 30-Party Alliance continued its agitation and
declared a Nepal Band (nationwide shutdown) for 7–9 April 2015. However, this
was suddenly and unexpectedly called off by the UCPN-M’s leader Pushpa Kamal
Dahal (a.k.a. ‘Prachanda’), at the end of the first day. Dahal cited a minimal
presence of activists on the streets and the danger of an adverse reaction to
a strike, but analysts suspected other reasons, including a lack of support from
China, whence Dahal had very recently returned, and the Maoist leadership’s
possible vulnerability to prosecution for war crimes under transitional justice
legislation if they remained on the political margins.23 Realising that their move-
ment was not going to gather force and that the CA was likely to simply proceed
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without them, the Maoists adopted a more conciliatory approach. The NC and
UML also conceded that consensus needed to be sought on certain points. Dahal
and the UML leader Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli began to meet regularly from this
point onward to work towards forging a working alliance, probably because they
both knew that the NC-UML coalition would not survive long after the promulga-
tion of the new constitution.24
Seismic change?
The situation on the eve of 25 April earthquake was as follows. The NC-UML
coalition was determined to get a constitution voted through the CA with a two-
thirds majority, and had vowed to achieve this by the end of June.25 This would
exclude the UCPN-M and most of the Madhes-based parties, mainly because it
would introduce the bare bones of a federal structure that had a smaller number
of provinces than the Maoists had argued for, none of which would be named or
demarcated on the basis of minority identities, and a map of federal Nepal with
provincial boundaries that paid little heed to Madhesi demands. Oli was anxious
that this should happen as quickly as possible so that Koirala would retire from
the premiership and open the way to him becoming Prime Minister (see
Figure 3). For its part, the Maoist leadership feared that it was at risk of
becoming marginal or even irrelevant. It urgently needed to find a way of
compromising without losing face in order to re-enter the political mainstream,
and was clearly prepared to offer concessions.26
Figure 2. A member of the dominant Khas-Arya community sits down to a huge meal labelled ‘power/
resources’ in a chair labelled ‘Mandale Nationalism’. A Janajati, a Dalit and a Madhesi ask him for
a share, and he replies ‘No, the country will break into pieces.’ Cartoon by Rabin Sayami, reproduced
with the permission of Nagarik newspaper and the artist.
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Many political commentators write of the earthquake of 25 April 2015 bringing the
parties ‘to the same place’ (ekai thauma).27 Amid calls for political and societal unity from
almost every quarter, many op-eds in leading Nepali newspapers in the early weeks of the
aftermath debated the merits of forming a ‘national government’. Supporters of this idea
argued that it would protect Nepal’s national interests at a time when so many foreign
powers were active within its borders, and compensate for the weakness of the sitting Prime
Minister. A national government would be better at coordinating disaster management and
reconstruction, building a new constitution, and organising long-awaited local elections.
The fear (or alleged fear) that the lack of a constitution at a time of national disaster would
undermine or even threatenNepal’s national sovereigntymay have had some part to play in
determining political priorities at national leadership level. Within two days of the 25 April
earthquake, the BBC reported that rescue and relief teams had already been dispatched by
India, China, Pakistan, Israel, Japan, the USA, and the UK.28 After two weeks, it was
reported that about 4900 military personnel from 34 different countries were engaged in
relief operations in Nepal.29 Although initially welcomed, the Indian intervention quickly
became controversial, largely because of what was perceived as the insensitive behaviour of
many Indian news reporters. Concerns were also expressed about Indian aircraft flying over
sensitive border regions to the north. Although the Nepal government gratefully accepted
pledges from the international community amounting to a total of 4.4 USD billion (see
Figure 4 for a sardonic representation of this), it turned away relief aid in a number of
Figure 3. Nepal’s political leadership in the immediate aftermath of the April earthquake: Khadga
Prasad Sharma Oli of the UML is trying to shake Sushil Koirala of the NC out of the Prime Minister’s
chair, while Pushpa Kamal Dahal of the UCPN-M looks on from a distance. A person buried under
rubble cries ‘save me’, but Oli merely exhorts others to come to their rescue. A cartoon by Rabindra
Adhikari, from Nepal Patrika, 7 June 2015. Reproduced with the permission of Kantipur Publications.
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instances. Its rejection of an offer of help from Taiwan is readily explicable in terms of
Nepal’s reluctance to offend China, but the decision not to allow the UK government to
deploy Chinook helicopters into Nepali airspace led to the circulation of conspiracy
theories concerning the legacy of the 1996–2006 ‘People’s War’.30
In an interview given to OnlineKhabar.com on 13 June 2015, the Maoist leader Pushpa
Kamal Dahal made a clear reference to the dangers he believed Nepal’s status as
a sovereign country would face if its leaders took another eight years to agree a new
constitution, saying ‘there will no longer be any national party, no leader, the leaders’
credibility will fall below zero, and the reputation and independence of the country will
be in danger.’31 A number of other politicians were consulted off the record during the
course of this research, and I found general agreement among them that there was a fear
that the earthquake might lead to a higher level of international interference – not due to
the lack of a constitution per se, but because the state was weak.
Opponents of a national government argued that the inter-party negotiations that
would be a necessary preliminary to its establishment would waste time that would be
better spent on relief work, and that a unitary government with no opposition would be
like a return to the undemocratic Panchayat period.32 In the event, a Nepali ‘national
government’ never came into being. Instead, the leaders of the NC, UML, UCPN-M and
Madhesi Janadhikar Forum-Loktantrik (Madhesi Forum for People’s Rights-Democratic;
hereafter ‘MJF-D’) moved quickly on 8 June 2015 to draft and sign a 16 Point Agreement
that would provide the basis for the ‘fast track’ completion and promulgation of a new
Figure 4. Sushil Koirala, the Prime Minister of the day, returns from the donors’ meeting held in
Kathmandu on 25 June 2015 bearing a suitcase labelled ‘international assistance’. His much smaller
shoulder bag is labelled ‘reconstruction’. A cartoon by Rabindra Adhikari, from Nepal Patrika,
28 June 2015. Reproduced with the permission of Kantipur Publications.
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constitution. According to the Agreement, the constitution would enshrine an eight-
province federal structure, based on five criteria of identity and four criteria of
capability.33 The provinces would be named by a two-thirds majority in each provincial
assembly and their geographical demarcation would be recommended by a federal
commission. The form of government had long been a point of contention, but now,
instead of actively opposing the idea of a parliamentary system, the UCPN(M) simply
registered a note of dissent (pharak mat) in order to allow the constitution writing to
proceed. It was agreed that the constitution writing process would be taken forward in
the spirit of the Agreement and that local bodies would be elected as soon as possible.34
Informally, it was understood that Sushil Koirala would vacate the office of Prime
Minister in favour of a UML leader after the promulgation of the constitution.35
The only Madhes-based party to sign up to this Agreement was the MJF-D. As
a consequence of the Maoists’ and the MJF-D’s signing of the Agreement, the Samyukta
Loktantrik Madhesi Morcha, a united front of all of the Madhes-based parties, broke off its
alliance with the Maoists, expelled the MJF-D, and rose up in opposition to the constitution-
drafting process.36
Pushpa Kamal Dahal defended his party’s decision to sign the 16-Point Agreement and
participate in the fast-track process in his 13 June interview with Online Khabar.37 He
argued that the republic, federalism, secularism and the principles of proportional repre-
sentation and inclusivity that were going to be enshrined in the new constitution were all
achievements of the ‘People’s War’ of which the Maoists should be proud, and he claimed
credit for bringing the parties together ‘at a time of crisis when the people are so greatly in
need of relief.’ He argued that if the Maoists sat ‘outside’ the process with the Adibasi
Janajati and Madhes-based parties and simply left the NC and UML to make the constitu-
tion on their own, the people would be ‘confused’. However, he warned that if the other
parties reneged on the promise of identity-based provinces or tried to create any provinces
containing both hill and Tarai districts, then the Maoists would launch a ‘powerful move-
ment’ against them. This sense of having to settle for a less than perfect constitution
quickly, because the political gains that had been made were at risk of being further eroded
in the earthquake aftermath, was also very clear in a conversation this author had with the
erstwhile Maoist leader and former Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai in February 2018:
Then at exactly that moment on 12 gate the earthquake struck. And attention was diverted
elsewhere. Such a massive national calamity. My view was that at least the people should be
sovereign. At least there should be a constitution . . . At least the people should be sovereign,
even if the constitution is weak. Getting sovereignty for the people was a big achievement
after the abolition of the monarchy in 2008. There was a danger of a reaction from the right
after the earthquake. And a danger from within, because the leaderships of NC and UML
were not so very committed to change. It was not their agenda. They only compromised
with us because of circumstances, when they were marginalised after [King] Gyanendra’s
coup [in 2005] . . . As everything was against us and there was a risk of more loss, so [we
thought] let us compromise as much as possible to make a constitution.38
However, the political scientist Krishna Hachhethu believes that it would be naive to take
these representations of the Maoists’ decision at face value. His reading is that the Maoist
senior leadership’s main concern during the months leading up to the earthquake was
how to regain the political space they had lost since the election of the second CA. They
had already decided to give the NC and UML free rein in the drafting of the constitution
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because they believed that the alliance between these two parties would break once it had
been promulgated, providing them with new leverage. Until the earthquake struck, the
public perception of the Maoists’ position on the constitution was that they were
committed to identity-based federalism, and to continuing to lead the 30-party alliance
in opposition to the other parties’ attempts to dilute this – a somewhat hopeless cause, in
the face of falling public support for their strikes and agitations. The earthquake gave the
Maoists a ‘good excuse’ to change their position and compromise on the content of the
constitution, on the understanding that it would thereby be promulgated speedily,
leading to the break-up of the ruling coalition.39
Drafting controversies
The 16-Point Agreement was widely welcomed in the mainstream Nepali media. For
example, Suman Khadka stated that the earthquake would provide ‘a new reference
point’ by replacing the 1996–2006 war as ‘the most defining event in contemporary
Nepal.’ From the earthquake he saw re-emerging ‘a Nepali identity’, which he described
as ‘a conflicted term in recent times’ (see Figure 5).40
The Agreement was viewed very differently in Madhesi political circles, where it was
seen as a ploy to renege on the commitments of the 2007 Interim Constitution and thus
circumvent Madhesi demands, postpone federalism, and reinstate the dominance of the
Khas-Arya establishment.41 The Madhesi lawyer Dipendra Jha played a leading role in an
attempt to have the Agreement declared unconstitutional. A writ petition to the Supreme
Court pleaded that the decision to leave the names and boundaries of the federal provinces
as matters which would be resolved after promulgation was in contravention of Articles 82
and 138 of the Interim Constitution.42 The Supreme Court responded by issuing a stay
order, directing the CA to include federal boundaries and power sharing provisions in the
constitution at the point of promulgation.43 In response, the 16-Point Agreement’s signa-
tory parties issued a defiant statement, asserting that the Supreme Court’s stay order ‘stands
Figure 5. The constitution, shown as a means of national unity and reconciliation, and as the basis for
Nepal’s post-earthquake reconstruction. From newspaper op-eds published in the Government-
owned newspaper Gorkhapatra by Acharya (2015) and Aryal (2015). Reproduced with the permission
of the Gorkhapatra Corporation.
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against the sovereign right of the people to frame their Constitution through the CA.’ The
CA was ‘an independent and capable body as far as the making of the Constitution is
concerned’ and its decision in this matter would be final.
So the drafting continued, in defiance of the Supreme Court order, and with virtually
no input from the wider CA membership. A first draft was presented on 30 June by the
NC’s Krishna Prasad Sitaula, who stated that it would be promulgated by 31 July,
‘provided there was no political earthquake’.44 In July, the draft was made available for
a public consultation exercise across all 240 electoral constituencies. This exercise lasted
for just 15 days, with a mere two days allocated for public feedback, but over 150,000
suggestions were received from the constituencies none the less.
The senior journalist Kishor Nepal observed the process of gathering suggestions from
the public in the mountainous Helambu district, and reported that most villagers were
too busy working in their fields or reconstructing earthquake damage to contribute:
Even leaders at village level knew the constitution was already complete, and that the collection
of suggestions was just for the sake of delivering the process. However, setting the people to
one side might have aroused challenges to the legality of the constitution, and the pretence
(natak) of collecting suggestions was also necessary for international consumption.45
Ujjwal Prasai provides a vivid account of the same process in the Siraha, Morang and
Jhapa districts of the Tarai. Here the situation was very different, with boycott move-
ments and security crackdowns in several locations, and a clear division of opinion
between the Madhesi and Pahadi populations. When he asked a local activist to identify
the demands of the Madhes that had not been addressed by the draft constitution, he
received the following reply:
‘You did not need to come all this way to understand that. Doesn’t Kathmandu understand?
It’s clear. Create two provinces in the Madhes. Provide the proper level of representation in all
government bodies, in proportion to the population. Consider the daughters in law who come
to marry us, and our mothers who came before, as equal Nepali citizens. That’s it (bas).’46
According to Khanal, the most common suggestions were
1) declaring Nepal a Hindu state; 2) delineation of the boundary of the provinces before the
promulgation of the constitution; (3) simpler provision for citizenship – either by the name
of mother or father; 4) keeping the number of provinces to the minimum; etc.47
There appears to have been very little concern aboutmatters such as how the new provinces
would be delineated or which cities should be made their capitals: ‘when the constitution
itself was confused (anyolma) on such matters, it was not hard to understand that those
giving suggestions would be confused too’.48 On the basis of the suggestions received, the
four parties announced that they would consider seven main issues: directly elected
executive head; rights of Dalits and women; citizenship; religion; electoral provisions for
local bodies; demarcation of federal units; and the judiciary.49 They came upwith a new six-
province model, and also added a clarificatory note on the definition of secularism.
Public protests against the six-province model erupted in the Karnali region and the
mid-West, and a concession was granted in response to these: the mid-west development
region would become a separate, seventh province. In stark contrast, the Tharuhat
movement, launched at about the same time to demand a separate province for the
Tharu people of the West Tarai, degenerated into violence and was suppressed with the
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use of lethal force. The MJF-D demanded a review of provincial boundaries and either
a move to an eight-province model, including both Tharuhat and the Karnali province,
or a reversion to the original six-province model. Once it became clear that the three
other parties were not ready to accommodate this demand, the MJF-D, which had been
one of the signatories to the original 16-Point Agreement, walked out and joined the
Madhesi Morcha in boycotting the process thereafter.
Thus, no Madhes-based party was involved in the final stages of the adoption of the
constitution. A plenary meeting of the CA attended by more than 90% of its members
passed the Constitution Bill clause by clause between 13 and 16 September. Meanwhile,
‘the entire southern plain (Kailali to Morang) was engulfed in violent protests’.50 The
Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jayashankar came to Kathmandu to try to persuade the
political leadership to delay promulgation ‘so that Madhesi parties could also be brought
on board’ but was rebuffed.51 When the Constitution Bill as a whole was put to the vote, it
was passed by an 85% majority: of the 598 members in the House, eight abstained, 25
voted against, and 57 boycotted the vote. Most of those who did not vote in favour were
Madhesi members, meaning that ‘a significant chunk of the population did not own [the
constitution] when it was proclaimed’.52
Criticisms of the new constitution
Julia Strasheim lists three factors that can limit the legitimacy of territorial reform:
(1) the dominance of elite actors; (2) the effect of tight deadlines on these actors’ decision-
making quality; and (3) the risks posed by embedding territorial reforms into a wider
‘concert’ of institutional reforms that, as a whole, sparks fears of marginalisation.53
All of these factors were clearly at play in the drafting of Nepal’s 2015 constitution. The
greatest challenge to its legitimacy arose from the fact that the federal structure did not
locate the whole of the country’s Madhesi population in purely Madhesi provinces, as per
Madhesi demands. The twenty districts of the Tarai were distributed among five pro-
vinces: four of these also contained hill districts, and the only purely Tarai province was
Province no. 2. In addition to this, although the 2015 Constitution retained many of the
progressive aspects of the 2007 Interim Constitution, it was also seen to have either
reneged on or diluted some of them, as follows:
(i) Certain of its provisions for the acquisition of citizenship were widely perceived
to discriminate against women, and against Madhesi women in particular, who
are more likely to marry across the national border with India. Whereas the
foreign wife of a Nepali man could begin the process of acquiring citizenship
immediately, the foreign husband of a Nepali woman would have to wait for
fifteen years for naturalisation, granted at the state’s discretion.54 Thus, the power
of an individual to confer citizenship upon his or her spouse was unequal and
dependent upon that individual’s gender. Similarly, a Nepali woman married to
a foreign man could only confer naturalised citizenship to her child, whereas
a Nepali man married to a foreign woman could confer citizenship by descent55
Naturalised citizens would not be eligible for appointments to positions of high
public office at national or provincial level.
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(ii) The new constitution reduced the proportion of the legislature elected through
a PR system from 58% to 40% for both national and provincial legislatures and
gave the population an unequal measure of representation at both provincial and
national levels. Each province would send eight members to the upper house of
parliament, regardless of significant differences in the total population of the
provinces, and a change in the relative weighting of population and geography as
factors determining the delineation of electoral constituencies raised the fear that
the people of the Tarai would not be represented in proportion to their overall
population. Moreover, whereas the Interim Constitution of 2007 allowed for the
re-delineation of constituency boundaries every ten years, in the 2015 constitu-
tion this was extended to 20 years. This was likely to work against the interests of
Tarai districts, where in-migration from the hills still continued.
(iii) The Interim Constitution had specified that marginalised groups would have ‘the
right to participate in state structures on the basis of principles of proportional
inclusion’ (Article 21). The 2015 constitution maintained this principle, but
omitted the word ‘proportional’ (samanupatik) in the relevant Article (Article
42(1)) and extended the list of social categories to which it promised a greater
measure of inclusivity to include the poorer members of the dominant upper
caste grouping: ‘economically poor (aarthikruple vipanna) Khas-Arya’.56
(iv) The addition of a clarificatory note to the definition of secularism which used the
term sanatan, with its whiff of Hindu conservatism, instead of the more neutral
parapurva of the 2007 Interim Constitution, was widely seen as a concession to
those who still conceived of Nepal as originally and essentially Hindu.57
The Madhesi rebellion continued to gather force and attracted Indian support, leading to
a blockading of the main overland supply routes into Kathmandu. A total of 58 people,
including both civilians and security personnel, were killed in violence in the Tarai.
Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli, who took over from Sushil Koirala on
12 October 2015, responded with nationalist rhetoric and attempted to secure Nepal’s
fuel supplies from China instead of from India, reviving the 18th century nationalistic
dream of Nepal’s survival as a yam between two equidistant boulders.
Conclusion
Capoccia and Kelemen urge researchers interested in critical junctures to move into the
realm of ‘counterfactual analysis’ by analysing ‘what happened in the context of what
could have happened’.58 The narrative account I have offered here of Nepal’s constitu-
tional process since 2008 shows that the popular notion of the earthquake’s direct
political causality (which I would summarise as ‘something happened which might not
have happened: if there had been no earthquake there would have been no constitution’)
is almost certainly wrong. The overwhelming consensus amongst all those I consulted in
the course of my research was that in all probability Nepal would have received a new
constitution in 2015, even if the earthquakes of that year had not taken place. This is
because the once-powerful Maoists had already been marginalised and the NC and UML
were well on their way to forging a new dispensation by the time of the first earthquake.
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The earthquakes were quickly framed by both government and media as a national
trauma and a cause for national mobilisation, although only 31 of the country’s 75
districts had been directly affected. Much of the public discourse in the immediate
aftermath focused on the need for political and social unity across the nation, as
evidenced not only in political speeches, media editorials and news coverage, but also
in popular culture. Harrowell and Özerdem record a number of comments made by their
informants about the earthquake bringing renewed ‘social harmony’ in its immediate
aftermath, ‘when Nepalese society came together across political, social or ethnic lines to
work together’.59 Nepali poets and songwriters amplified this message, representing the
earthquakes as a socially levelling and unifying force.60
‘Social harmony’ (samajik sadbhavna) has a specific meaning in Nepali political
discourse, and it is often used in opposition to the idea of ‘inclusion’ (samaveshikaran).
For those who had long opposed the inclusion agenda, construing it as a threat to
‘national unity’ (rastriya ekta), the earthquake aftermath presented an opportunity.
The national character of the post-disaster narrative favoured and empowered major-
itarian conservative forces, which were particularly prominent among the hill popula-
tions. Moreover, the 2015 earthquakes did not strike areas where federalism was
a burning issue, and the threat to the historical status quo represented by the post-
2006 agenda of minority inclusion was already receding in the Nepali domestic political
sphere, because its proponents were electorally weak. Thus, those who had advanced the
inclusion agenda saw the ground slipping away from beneath their feet, and decided that
it was necessary to secure whatever gains they could, before the dust settled and the rising
hill nationalism of the aftermath swept even these away. Hence the Maoists’ surprising
flexibility, and, initially at first, the MJF-D’s willingness to be a part of the process.
Some might argue that what has been described here is a classic instance of Pelling and
Dill’s ‘accelerated status quo’ in which the dominant use the chaos of a disaster aftermath
to ram through their own agenda at the expense of the marginalised. To assess this claim,
it is of course necessary to compare the post-earthquake and pre-earthquake status quos,
but it is also important to ask exactly how these status quos are being defined. What was
the status quo in Nepal prior to the 2015 earthquakes? One answer might be that it was
the complicated, stalemated post-1990 struggle between classes, ethnicities, and regions
that was most dramatically represented by the ten-year-long People’s War, and then
persisted in the form of a political deadlock in the CA.61 For the purposes of the present
discussion, however, I have taken it to be the much longer-standing, historical status quo
of Khas-Arya hegemony which has been the backdrop for almost every field of political
contestation in Nepal for generations.
Despite its dilution of the post-1990 inclusion agenda, the 2015 constitution does not
represent a complete reinstatement of this Khas-Arya hegemony, or a complete closure
by the political elites of avenues leading to adjustments of the political order. It has not
denied all of the demands of marginalised groups: most significantly, it has granted
federalism, albeit not in the shape and form that the Madhes-based parties had
demanded. Equally, however, it could be said to be regressive in respect of matters
such as proportionality of representation, gender and citizenship, its definition of
secularism, and the introduction of a quota for a section of the historically dominant
section of the population. Elements of the status quo ante of Khas-Arya dominance could
be said to have been reinforced – ‘accelerated’ in Pelling and Dill’s formulation – but they
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now sit alongside other provisions that represent partial fulfilments of longstanding
minority demands. These concede enough to reduce long-term support for continued
oppositional activity, without providing much of a foundation for building provincial
units that might challenge the federal state. So the constitution that was promulgated
does not measure up very well to either side of the binary choice offered us by Pelling and
Dill: oppositional forces were not able to use the opportunity presented by the chaotic
aftermath of the earthquakes to radically alter the terms of the social contract, nor did the
established elite use it as an opportunity to deny all of their demands.
Capoccia and Kelemen believe that change is not a necessary element of a critical
juncture. They argue that there is no reason to discard cases in which change is
considered but ultimately rejected as ‘non–critical’ junctures because ‘ . . . ignoring the
near misses of history would actually deprive scholars of important and interesting
negative cases with regard to the outcomes they seek to explain.’62
So what effect did the 2015 earthquakes have on the constitutional process in Nepal?
Returning to the punctuation metaphor with which I began, I would argue that the
disaster was neither a full stop, nor a comma. It did not bring a complete end to any line
of political discourse or institutional development: the constitution was probably com-
ing, and come it certainly did. But the disaster was not merely a pause or a temporary
distraction either, because the process of change and the discourse that accompanied it
did not carry on into the aftermath exactly as before. Instead, I would suggest that if the
earthquake was a critical juncture – and this will always remain a matter of opinion and
argument, not of objective, verifiable fact – its effect was to modify the terms of Nepal’s
internal political conversation. Rather like a lens bending the light that passes through it,
it refracted the debate, strengthening some lines of argumentation and weakening others.
Fears of threats to national sovereignty could be stirred up more readily in the earthquake
aftermath, minority demands could more easily be framed as divisive. Moreover, contra
Harrowell and Özerdem, the key political players within Nepal did not see the process of
institutionalising the Comprehensive Peace Agreement simply as ‘post-conflict recon-
struction’ (which may reflect more of a donor/INGO agenda), but also as an ongoing
struggle for access to power and resources. The earthquake aftermath provided the
section of the political elite that had the upper hand at that juncture with an opportunity
to deliver a constitutional settlement that might not otherwise have been supported
across the country, and oppositionists with an opportunity to extricate themselves from
politically unprofitable positions in which they had hitherto been locked, in order to
rejoin the political mainstream.
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